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THE BETRAYAL OF JUDGMENT
Lawrence Sager*
I. FIDELITY
A. Fidelity to Role, or Fidelity as Role
ONCERNED as we are with fidelity in constitutional practice, we
have to distinguish at the outset between the fidelity of judges
and other constitutional interpreters to their appropriate roles and fidelity as the content of the role that judges and other constitutional
interpreters are meant to play. To dissent from the proposition that
judges should be faithful to their proper role is to dissent from a tautology: of course it is right for judges to do what is right for judges to
do. All the work is left to be done in deciding what it is that is right
for constitutional judges to do. I assume we are talking about fidelity
as constitutive of what it is that is right for judges to do, that we are
talking about fidelity as role, not fidelity to role.

C

Fidelity as Instruction-Taking
So the proper role of judges is to be faithful to something, and our
concern is both what it is they are to be faithful to and what it means
to be faithful to that thing. These are the broad questions that are
meant to provide the thread for our conversation. But to speak of
fidelity as role is to agree on more than just that justices are meant to
be faithful to something. For example, if I said that judges are meant
to be faithful to their best judgment about securing the just outcome
in the case before them, without reference to anything but their philosophical reflections, I would have missed the point about fidelity.
There may be different views about what fidelity requires judges to
be faithful to and what it means to be faithful to that thing, but there
is some common ground implicit in the idea of fidelity as role.
Roughly, the idea of fidelity as the role of a constitutional judge requires us to distinguish between a judge following instructions from
our constitutional past as to the proper outcome of a case before her,
and a judge forming her own judgment as to the proper outcome of a
case on the other. At the heart of fidelity is the notion that a judge
should follow instructions, not act on her own judgment.
More precisely, the notion at the heart of fidelity is that courts
should follow instructions rather than act on their independent judgment. I restate the point this way because those who worry that constitutional judges are acting on their independent judgment and
thereby being unfaithful to the Constitution will not be consoled by
the assurance that the judges in question are conscientiously following
B.
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the protocol of adjudication and reaching outcomes substantially
shaped by prior judicial decisions and shaded by the contemporary
workings of collegiality. They worry about the independence of the
constitutional judiciary as an institutional whole, not only about rogue
judges.'
C. How Fidelity Is Like Chaos
There is an irony here. Discourse about fidelity in constitutional
practice is like the preoccupation of some mathematicians and scientists with chaos. The nominal study of chaos turns out not to be about
chaos at all, but rather about the order that underlies what we regard
as chaotic. So too, discourse about fidelity in constitutional practice
turns out to be importantly concerned not merely with the obligation
of the judge to follow instructions, but with the concomitant license/
obligation of a judge to act on her own judgment.
A common and important theme in the conversation about fidelity
in constitutional practice is this: a conscientious judge, setting out to
be as faithful as possible to the instructions of the Constitution (and/or
whatever other instructions are taken to be binding upon her) will
discover that the instructions cannot simply be followed; such a judge
will discover that in order to follow the instructions she must exercise
her own normative judgment. What we might call pure or simple fidelity is impossible: paradoxically, fidelity requires the judge to step
outside the frame of instructions.
II.

RELUCTANT JUDGMENT THEORISTS

A.

Two Examples

I want to give two examples of this paradoxical turn in thought
about fidelity to the Constitution. These two examples have interesting features in common which qualify them as members of a distinct
school of constitutional theory which I am going to call reluctant judgment theory.
My two examples are represented in the symposium of which this
paper is a part. The first is the idea of fidelity as translation,championed by Larry Lessig;2 the second is the idea of fidelity as synthesis,
championed by Bruce Ackerman 3 (though not the focus of his prepared remarks for this Symposium). Because I plan to be somewhat
critical of these two ideas, I should say at the outset that I hold Professors Lessig and Ackerman in high regard, in no small measure be1. In the discussion that follows, I will refer to the independent judgment of

judges because of an expositional preference for the human rather than the institutional; but I mean to include the idea of the independence of courts as an alternate
reading in all such references.
2. See Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation,71 Tex. L. Rev. 1165 (1993).
3. See Bruce Ackerman, We the People: Foundations 142-62 (1991).
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cause they have offered original and arresting ideas about
constitutional practice, ideas worth arguing about.
Let me give nutshell accounts of their positions. I am sure to fail to
do justice to the nuance and force of their claims, but for the moment
I mean only to get enough on the table to explain what these ideas
have in common and where they run into difficulty. Roughly, then,
the point of Lessig's work on constitutional translation is this: to be
faithful to the instructions of the Constitution we have the conceptual
burden of translating from one language to another, and then some.
To paraphrase the waggish remark that the English and Americans
are two peoples divided by a common language: we share with the
framing generations a common language, but we are divided by profoundly different cultures. Translation involves sensitivity to both the
context of writing and the context of application, and many elements
in the two contexts may diverge, including (perhaps especially) firm
presuppositions in the prevailing world views of these political generations so separated by time and circumstance. Translation inevitably
involves a wide range of choice and judgment; it implicates a constitutional court in a practice that seems at times far removed from following instructions.
Ackerman's project centers on the claim-which really is about fidelity-that the Constitution can be and has been importantly
amended by broad and sustained political consensus even though that
consensus was not manifest in the way stipulated by Article V.4 In
certain times political concerns become superheated and politics are
transformed from ordinary to constitutional; if an appropriate consensus forms in the crucible of constitutional politics, the distillate is an
amendment to the Constitution, notwithstanding the absence of an
Article V provenance. The job of a constitutional judge is to enforce
the whole of the Constitution, including these informal amendments.
I find much to disagree with in this picture, and will at least gesture
towards my concerns below. For the moment though, I want to focus
on how Ackerman's provocative view of fidelity gives license to
judges to step outside their instructions and exercise their own normative judgment. The rough idea is this: while in principle judges are
exclusively responsible to the Constitution's instructions, the Constitution includes important informal amendments like that which
emerged from the New Deal. The effective Constitution is thus somewhat cluttered with overlapping and even contradictory instructions
and judges are obliged to effectuate a synthesis among them. Thus,
meaning has to be assigned to informal constitutional amendments
like the one that emerged in the midst of the New Deal, and then that
meaning has to be reconciled with the Constitution as it was before. It
is in the course of this reading of the unwritten and synthesis of the
4. U.S. Const. art. V.
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dense that the normative judgment of judges is engaged and overflows
the role of simply following instructions.
B.

Reluctant Judgment Theories (And How Fidelity Differs
from Chaos)
What the models or metaphors of translation and synthesis have in
common is a basal, unmitigated commitment to fidelity in principle,
coupled with the discovery that pure or complete fidelity is impossible. For Lessig or Ackerman, the good judge aspires to take instructions, and is the best instruction-taker she can be. Were a stance of
pure instruction-taking possible for the constitutional judge, she
would maintain such a stance. But it is not possible: the instructions
of the historical Constitution have to be translated or reconciled and
the enterprise of translation or reconciliation inevitably engages independent normative judgment to some extent. It would be self-defeating to try to exclude these judgmental ingredients of adjudication,
because we would ultimately have a product that was less rather than
more faithful to the instructions of the past. Fidelity for such theorists
thus begins with the instruction-taking imperative but is tempered by
the necessary intrusion of normative independence. We can call accounts of fidelity in our constitutional practice which assume this general form reluctant judgment theories, because judgment enters the
story as an afterthought, as an inevitable but unfortunate limit on the
instruction-taking impulse.
Fidelity in these accounts is still in the grip of the norm of instruction-taking. The job of the conscientious judge is to be as much of an
instruction-taker as possible and to allow her own normative judgment to enter the picture only as required by the enterprise of taking
instruction. Fidelity, so understood, is ultimately different than chaos
theory, which replaces apparent chaos with the revelation of order.
Reluctant judgment fidelity never forsakes its allegiance to instruction-taking; its accommodation of contemporary normative judgment
is in the name of, and governed by, that allegiance.
III.

A CRITIQUE OF RELUCTANT JUDGMENT THEORY
A. Two Models of ConstitutionalAdjudication
We can better understand reluctant judgment theory and its shortcomings if we consider two quite different general models of the role
of constitutional judges. The first is the model of agency, the second
of partnership. In the agency model the popular constitutional decision-maker-"The People" at the appropriate time and in the appropriate way, whenever and however that might be thought to be-is the
principal, and constitutional judges are the agents. The job of judges
is to be the best instruction-takersthey can be, and their warrant to act
in the name of the Constitution is tightly bounded to that role. The
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desired end of constitutional adjudication is the discovery, decoding,
and execution of the instructions of the popular constitutional decision-maker; independent judgment by judges is only the consequence
or by-product of their agency, and an unfortunate by-product at that.
In the partnership model, in contrast, the popular constitutional decision-maker and constitutional judges are collaborators,and the independent judgment of judges is expected and welcomed as a central
part of their responsibility in the partnership. The partnership model,
it should be emphasized, need not exclude hierarchy (and concomitantly, instruction-giving, and taking) or concede unlimited judgmental authority to judges. On any plausible understanding of our
constitutional practice, the popular constitutional decision-maker has
the final say when it chooses to speak in terms that quash or restrain
reflection from its junior, judicial partner. But the partnership model
does require that, at the end of the day, constitutional judges be invited to exercise a substantial modicum of independent judgment, and
are valued precisely because of their judgmental role.
The distinction between the agency and partnership models is
meant to call attention to different ways we can think about the responsibilities of constitutional judges on an ongoing basis. It does not
invoke or depend upon the provenance of those responsibilities.
Were we to conclude for example, that the popular constitutional
decisionmaker had in effect invited the collaboration of constitutional
judges in giving content to the broad liberty-bearing provisions of the
Constitution, that would be fully consistent with choosing partnership
as the best understanding of the resulting constitutional role.
B. Problem with the Agency Model of Our ConstitutionalPractice
Reluctant judgment theories have an advantage over more extreme
versions of the agency model. Accounts of our constitutional practice
which portray the role of judges as exclusively that of taking instructions from the Constitution and the generations that framed its terms
("historicist" or "originalist" accounts) are transparently implausible.
The broad generalities with which most of the liberty-bearing provisions of the Constitution are framed demand wide-bodied interpretation; they read as normative ideals, not as instructions for the
resolution of specific cases or the fashioning of a systematic jurisprudence. The actual practice of constitutional adjudication, in turn, engages the ongoing normative judgment of the judiciary at every
interesting point. Free speech, freedom of religion, and equality
(equal protection)-all these important calls of the liberty-bearing
Constitution demand and get the rich normative mediation of the judiciary for their implementation. Historicist judges and commentators
themselves are routinely and rather notoriously embarrassed by the
fact that they too have had to generate and defend accounts or theo-
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ries of the abstract values named in the Constitution.5 Reluctant judgment theories can survive the force of these unduckable observations,
because they agree-indeed, insist-that instruction-taking, unenlightened by appropriately pointed contemporary normative judgment, is an impossible judicial protocol.
But if reluctant judgment theories are more plausible than more
extreme versions of the agency model of constitutional practice, their
advantage is only a matter of degree, and ultimately, they are vulnerable to many of the same objections as those that greet their more extreme conceptual cousins. While reluctant judgment theories concede
that conscientious constitutional instruction-takers must engage in independent normative judgment, they miss the point that the libertybearing provisions of the Constitution and our actual experience
under them are starkly inconsistent with the idea that instruction-taking is the appropriate starting point for understanding our constitutional practice. The enterprise of bringing meaning to the
Constitution involves at its core a collaboration between the framing
generations who fixed the text of that document and those who undertake to apply the precepts named in the text to concrete issues that
arise in the maintenance of our political community; both sides of that
collaboration have to engage their faculties of normative judgment.
Were this not otherwise obvious, the Ninth Amendment 6 would
make it so. The Ninth Amendment puts the instruction-taking view of
constitutional practice in conceptual gridlock. If the Constitution's
text is understood to be the primary source of instruction for the
judge, what is the conscientious instruction-taker supposed to do
when the text itself tells her not to limit the scope of constitutional
liberty to the rights stipulated in the Constitution? The instructiontaking judge: "I am bound to take my instructions from the Constitution; if the Constitution is silent, then I am bound to do nothing, that
is, to leave the status quo absent my intervention in place." The Constitution: "I instruct you to intervene in some circumstances about
which I am otherwise silent." The Ninth Amendment itself is open to
interpretation, of course, but among its possible readings the most direct and plausible is exactly this.' The hapless instruction-taking judge
is thus in the position of the army barber who is ordered to shave
every man on the post who does not shave himself.
We should not regard these features of the Constitution and/or our
constitutional practice as causally accidental or normatively incidental. The generations responsible for framing the text of the Constitu5. See Lawrence Sager, Back to Bork, N.Y. Rev. Books, Oct. 25, 1990, at 23.
6. U.S. Const. amend. IX ("The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain

rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.").
7. See Lawrence Sager, You Can Raise the First, Hide Behind the Fourth, and
Plead the Fifth. But What on Earth Can You Do with the Ninth Amendment?, 64 Chi.Kent L. Rev. 239 (1988).
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tion could have chosen to speak in gritty detail rather than moral
generality; in making the choice that they did, they depended upon
the collaboration of those who would be responsible for implementing
the broad values invoked in the Constitution's text. The Ninth
Amendment, in turn, is best understood as responding to the worst
fears of those who loved liberty but had doubts about the wisdom of
including what ultimately became the Bill of Rights in the Constitution: that no simple list of the liberties of a free people could do justice to justice, and that by the principle of expressio unious, exclusio
alterious a bill of rights would do more harm than good.
These choices of the framing generations are in turn causally connected to our constitutional structure. Article V was expected to
make the Constitution obdurate to amendment and it succeeded in so
doing to an extraordinary degree. Faced with the prospect of an extremely long-lived Constitution, and the requirements of Articles V
and VII for a broad geographic consensus-a reasonable proxy for
cultural consensus, especially at the most pertinent times in our constitutional history-the framing generations naturally opted for general
moral commitments rather than a plethora of concrete instantiations
of those commitments. Collaboration rather than instruction-taking is
built into the structure of our constitutional practices, from the ground
up.
This last observation brings us to a still more telling criticism of reluctant judgment theories. Because they maintain instruction-taking
as the ideal, and make room for independent judgment only out of
reluctant necessity, the reluctant judgment theorists are constrained to
see our constitutional practices as they actually are as an embarrassment. The broad moral commands of the liberty-bearing provisions of
the Constitution on their view constitute a rather fundamental mistake, and the Ninth Amendment, unless it can be banished by construal, a disaster. Indeed, the very idea of a Constitution is rendered
suspect if we regard popular judgment as talismanic and the independent judgment of the constitutional judiciary as unwelcome. An enduring constitution is almost certain to raise special problems of
translation and synthesis as Lessig and Ackerman use those terms;
parliamentary democracy would surely reduce the independent judgmental freight of the judiciary. And even if in some preternatural way
an enduring constitution could be crafted so as to issue completed instructions to judges and other public officials-instructions completed
in the sense that they would not in principle require independent normative judgment on the part of the instruction-taker-why would we
be inclined to let the judgment of political generations long since dead
govern us today?
In contrast, the partnership model invites reflection on the practical
virtues of our constitutional practices as they actually are. The partnership model is open to (indeed, depends upon) the belief that the
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collaboration between a popular constitutional decision-maker which
paints in broad strokes and a judicial constitutional decision-maker
which fills in these strokes with close and reflective detail is reasonably well-suited to the enterprise of securing the fundamentals of
political justice.8 This is the justice-seeking account of our constitutional practice, and I believe it to be the best account of that practice.
The reader may feel that I am forcing constitutional theory, and
hence constitutional theorists, against an artificially sharp dichotomy
between the agency model with its instruction-taking ideal and the
partnership model with its collaborative ideal. It may appear that I
have somehow lumbered reluctant judgment theory with conceptual
entailments that it need not accept. But the point is this: either we
value the independent judgment of judges as collaborators in the constitutional project of identifying the fundamental demands of political
justice or we do not. If we do not, then it makes perfectly good sense
to regard the presence of such judgment in our constitutional practice
as necessary but of no positive value-and more likely, of considerable negative value-outside the compass of that necessity. In turn, it
makes perfectly good sense to cabin the license of judges to the
bounds of that necessity. In contrast, if we do value the independent
judgment of judges as an important part of a collaboration reasonably
well-suited to the important constitutional project of securing the fundamentals of political justice, then it is wrong to confine the exercise
8. See Lawrence Sager, The Domain of ConstitutionalJustice, in Constitutionalism: Philosophical Foundations (Larry Alexander ed., forthcoming 1997) (Sager's
manuscript at 7-8, on file with the Fordham Law Review).
In the end, that belief may rise or fall on an assessment of our actual national experience in comparison with the experience of other nations. But
several features of constitutional adjudication make it ex ante a promising
candidate for the role assigned to it. First, the constitutional judiciary is specialized and redundant, like a quality control inspector. Judges are steeped
in the tradition of constitutional discourse, and their job is pointed towards
the evaluation of governmental conduct against the norms of the Constitution. Second, the coherence-driven protocol of adjudication is well-suited to
normative reflection. In the course of deciding a case before them, judges
are responsible to both past decisions and future possibilities; they must test
the principles upon which they are tempted to rely against these other outcomes, real and imagined. The enterprise of adjudication is thus a kind of
institutional reflective equilibration. Third, judges are obliged to give each
other and the broader audience of their opinions reasons for their decisions,
and these reasons are of a special sort. Judges' reasons are in principle publicly accessible and publicly defensible, they are exemplars of what some philosophers have called 'public reason.' Fourth, these features of
constitutional adjudication are strongly reinforced by the collegial, deliberative nature of important constitutional tribunals, most particularly, of the
Supreme Court itself. Fifth, constitutional adjudication as a process is reflective of what we might call the egalitarian logic of democracy: every claimant
before a court stands on equal footing; the force of her claim is the force of
reason-the strength of its connection to an articulated scheme of principle-not her wealth, popularity, or social stature.
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of that judgment to those circumstances where the exercise of judgment is parasitic to the task of following instructions. Constitutional
theorists have to choose up, and I understand reluctant judgment theorists like Larry Lessig and Bruce Ackerman to have cast their lot
with the impoverished agency model of our constitutional practice.
IV. BETRAYAL
In his article for this Symposium, Bruce Ackerman takes a step beyond the normal mode of academic persuasion and scolds those who
do not join him in recognizing the existence of a tacit New Deal
amendment to the Constitution.9 He accuses those of us who hold a
more conventional view of how the Constitution comes to be
amended-namely, by various actors who are aware that they are considering the profound act of amending the Constitution, and who seek
to conform their behavior to the requirements of Article V-of betraying the constitutional legacy of the New Deal. I think that Ackerman is wrong in this, and wrong for reasons closely associated with the
conceptual blinkers of reluctant judgment theory.
A. What Is Interesting About Ackerman's View of
ConstitutionalChange
There are obvious points about which most readers of the constitutional history of the New Deal agree. Certainly there were important
changes in constitutional doctrine: the Court's experiments with constitutionalizing a free market economy which reached their apogee in
Lochner v. New York'0 were set aside-definitively, we now know; the
prevailing jurisprudence of the commerce clause was refashioned
along lines generously permissive of federal governmental activity;
and, despite earlier misgivings, the administrative agency was accommodated in a constitutional framework not natively receptive to this
new mechanism of governance. These developments were somewhat
evulsive, and they were arrived at under the press of national and international circumstances which combined to convince many Americans of the necessity of a strong and nimble national government.
They were goaded by a strong and well-supported President who
threatened to pack the Court and who did make strategic appointments with doctrinal changes of exactly this sort in mind. In the end,
these changes in doctrine did more than permit Congress and President Roosevelt to pursue the mature New Deal agenda; they remade
the Court's constitutional jurisprudence in enduring ways.
With this general picture widely accepted and well understood it
may seem that there is little left to worry about. Plainly constitutional
9. See Bruce Ackerman, A Generation of Betrayal?, 65 Fordham L Rev. 1519,
1526 (1997).
10. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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law-and more, the constitutional order-changed during this period.
Why quarrel with amendment as the trope by which that change is
crystallized and displayed? If all that was at stake were rhetorical
flourish, we could concede that field to Ackerman and turn to more
interesting matters. But considerably more is at stake. This becomes
clear if we consider Ackerman's account of constitutional change from
the vantage of a conscientious judge.
Imagine that it is 1937, and all that actually happened has happened. A justice of the Supreme Court, heretofore a champion of a
rather restrictive view of the Commerce Clause, sits in his study, and
decides that, notwithstanding his prior judgment and the substantial
force of stare decisis, Congress should have broad, largely unfettered
authority to pursue its New Deal agenda. Now we can imagine two
very different sort of reasons our justice might have for this conversion. Having been educated by experience of and reflection upon the
Great Depression and its aftermath, he might have altered his judgment as to the best understanding of what limits on governmental
structure were appropriately assignable to the Constitution in the time
and place he found the nation and its economy. Or, looking back over
the political events of the last months or years, he might believe that
an appropriately formed and expressed political consensus had
emerged and produced a popular amendment to the Constitution, just
as though the text was formally amended in accord with Article V. In
the first story, the Constitution has remained constant but the judge's
understanding of it has changed; we can call this the judgmental account. In the second, the Constitution itself has changed, and this is
the reason that the judge has altered his understanding of what it permits; we can call this the positivist account.
Now it is important to note that both the judgmental and the positivist accounts can and are likely to be sensitive to history and social
context. Both might even be sensitive to the same features of the
practical world on occasion. For example, in both the judgmental and
the positivist account a justice might be influenced by the widely held
view that the commerce clause was being improperly invoked by the
Supreme Court to impede the national recovery effort; for the justice
in the judgmental account, this mounting consensus might be an important reason to reconsider his views. But the difference between
these accounts is profound, and profoundly important. In the judgmental account, it is the judge's own judgment that governs her interpretive obligation; in the positivist account, it is the formation of a
popular consensus under stipulated extra-Article V circumstances that
governs her interpretive obligation.
B.

Instruction-Takingand CollaborationRevisited

For our purposes here, I want to confine myself to two observations
about Ackerman's view of constitutional change. First, though he has

1997]

FIDELITY AS SYNTHESIS

1555

at times argued for this view as though it could be defended simply on
grounds of its better fit with unarguable historical data, this simply
cannot be the case. The more conventional understanding of the New
Deal includes by implication the judgmental account, and it can quite
satisfactorily embrace all the available data. If either view has difficulty on grounds of fit it is Ackerman's view, which labors against
what the Justices of the Supreme Court said and presumably thought
they were doing, and assigns to the mass of American voters a role as
constitutional decision-makers that they could hardly have realized
might be retroactively bestowed upon them. But my point is not that
fit decides the case against Ackerman, but rather that fit cannot decide the case, and that we need a strong normative ground for choosing between these accounts.
This brings me to my second observation. I think that there are a
number of normative grounds upon which to disprefer Ackerman's
account of constitutional change. But for now, I want to invoke the
distinction between the instruction-taking (agency) view and the collaborative (partnership) view of the role of the judiciary. We can now
see how deep Ackerman's commitment to the instruction-taking view
runs, not withstanding his softening that view with the need for synthesis. For Ackerman, the judicial role in its essence is strictly backward-looking, with judges constantly attentive to the instructions
given by the popular political process, whenever political events combine in the right fashion. Constitutional choice is quintessentially popular choice, and judicial judgment has only an incidental and (by
implication) unfortunate role to play. In contrast, the judgmental account of New Deal constitutionalism comfortably accommodates the
collaborative view of our constitutional practice. This alone is reason
enough to reject Ackerman's account. As we have seen, the agency
view neither fits nor flatters our constitutional practice.
C. Who Exactly Is Betraying Whom?
Early in his article, Ackerman contrasts the "intellectual curiosity of
a juristic elite" with the aspects of our constitutional practice which on
his account we should most highly value." Thus we dismiss the spark
of Holmes' dissent in Lochner (indeed, Ackerman's position commits
us to the view that Holmes and the other three Justices who dissented
in Lochner were wrong); and thus we dismiss the sound judgment of
the New Deal Court which ushered in the modem era of constitutional understanding; and thus we dismiss the moral wisdom of the
Warren Court in Brown v. Board of Education;'2 and thus we dismiss
11. Ackerman, supra note 8, at 1.
12. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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the courage and keen sense of justice of the current Court in Romer v.
Evans, 3 ... all this the intellectual curiosity of a juristic elite.
In the course of mounting his charge of betrayal, Ackerman speaks
of the tremendous political achievements of the New Deal as the work
of our parents' generation. In his and my case (oldish fogies that we
be), this is true, or very nearly true,... our parents were too young to
be the architects of the New Deal but not too young to be active members of the electorate that supported the architects in their efforts.
But he and I are also children of the Warren Court. We cut our constitutional teeth on the achievements of the Warren Court; and I very
much doubt that he or I would have devoted so much of our working
lives to the regard of the Constitution were it not for the contributions
of that Court to our national political experience.
I think that Professor Ackerman's understanding of our constitutional practice betrays the character and judgment of the judges who
have worked to uphold their end of our constitutional partnership,
that it betrays the very genius of our constitutionalism.

13. 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996).

